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In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,1 and 
revolutionized federal sentencing law. Post-Apprendi, lower courts struggled 
with areas of ambiguity arising from the case. This paper deals with one such 
lingering controversy. Under Apprendi, "other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."2 
The Court had previously indicated that the exception for prior convictions 
stemmed at least in part from the fact that the procedural safeguards required by 
Apprendi, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and trial by jury, had already been 
fulfilled during the prior criminal proceeding. Thus, there was no need for them 
to be imposed again during sentencing for the later offense.3 
The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 ("ACCA") permits enhancing the 
sentence for a violation of federal firearms laws4 beyond the statutory maximum 
to fifteen years if the offender has committed three or more "violent felonies" or 
"serious drug offenses."5 Juvenile adjudications for such crimes  qualify as 
predicate felonies.6 However, the Supreme Court has held that there is no 
constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudications.7 The question 
therefore arises: do juvenile adjudications fall within the prior convictions 
exception in Apprendi, even though those juvenile adjudications lack all the 
procedural safeguards accorded to adult criminal convictions? 
Most, but not all, circuits that have considered this question have answered 
in the affirmative.8 A number of legal commentators, however, have critiqued the 
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 1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 2. Id. at 490. 
 3. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (explaining that one reason for treating 
recidivism as a sentencing factor was that certain due process guarantees, including the right to trial 
by jury, had already attached in the previous proceeding). 
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). 
 6. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C) (2006) (the set of qualifying predicate felonies “includes a finding 
that a person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.”). 
 7. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 8. See infra part III. 
Swearingen_paginated (Do Not Delete) 10/14/2011  2:27:21 PM 
206 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 3:205 2011 
majority view.9 Some commentators have gone a step further, using their 
determination that juryless juvenile adjudications should not be used for the 
enhancement of adult convictions as a springboard from which to advocate the 
recognition of a jury trial right in juvenile adjudications.10 This paper sides with 
the majority of appellate courts in concluding that juryless juvenile adjudications 
contain sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy the reliability concerns 
articulated in Apprendi. Therefore they should continue to be used in the 
application of the sentence enhancement provision of the ACCA. 
In Part II, this article deals with some pertinent background: an overview of 
the evolution of the juvenile adjudication system, a brief treatment of the 
legislative history of the ACCA, and an overview of the Supreme Court 
sentencing law precedent which informs the lower courts' decisions. Part III 
summarizes lower courts' rationales on both sides of this issue. Part IV evaluates 
the relative merits of those arguments. Part V concludes. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
A.   The Development of the Juvenile Justice System 
In the early 20th century, states began creating separate juvenile court 
systems.11 Proliferation of juvenile justice systems was rapid: by 1917, forty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia had juvenile justice courts.12 Today all states 
use juvenile courts.13 The early advocates for juvenile courts were progressive 
reformers who believed juveniles lacked the maturity to be fully responsible for 
their actions, so trying them in adult criminal courts was inappropriate.14 
Instead, these advocates promoted the view that juvenile delinquents were 
children in need of the state's help, not criminals, and they designed the juvenile 
court system to achieve rehabilitation, not punishment.15 
 
 9. See, e.g., Jason Abbott, Note, The Use of Juvenile Adjudications Under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act, 85 B.U. L. REV. 263 (2005) (use of nonjury juvenile adjudications under the ACCA is 
unconstitutional); Emily Edwards, Comment, But I’m Just a Kid: Juvenile Adjudications and Sentencing 
Enhancements, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 227 (2009) (if juveniles do not receive the right to a jury trial, they 
face “the worst of both worlds”); Ellen Marrus, “That Isn’t Fair, Judge”: The Costs of Using Prior Juvenile 
Delinquency Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentencing, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1323, 1351, 1356–57 (2004) 
(arguing that juryless juvenile adjudications are less accurate, so either they should not be used as a 
basis for adult criminal sentences or the juvenile system should be scrapped entirely); Brian Thill, 
Comment, Prior “Convictions” Under Apprendi: Why Juvenile Adjudications May Not Be Used to Increase 
an Offender’s Sentence Exposure If They Have Not First Been Proven to a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 573, 601 (2004) (only those juvenile adjudications which have been tried before a jury 
should be used for adult criminal sentencing, to avoid violating “one of the fundamental liberties,” 
the right to a jury trial). 
 10. See, e.g., Thill, supra note 9; Sara Kropf, Comment, Overturning McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The 
Unconstitutionality of Using Prior Convictions to Enhance Adult Sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines, 
87 GEO. L.J. 2149, 2158–59 (1999). 
 11. See Kropf, supra note 10, at 2158–59; Brian Kennedy, Note, Nonjury Juvenile Adjudications as 
Prior Convictions under Apprendi, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 267, 274–75 (2004). 
 12. See Kropf, supra note 10, at 2158–59. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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This rehabilitative focus is clear from the euphemistic language of the 
juvenile court system, developed with the intent to protect juveniles from the 
stigma associated with a criminal prosecution.16 For instance, juveniles have 
hearings, not trials, and they are "adjudicated delinquent," not convicted.17 The 
language reflects early reformers' emphasis on using the juvenile courts as a 
setting for the state to intervene in the lives of troubled youths, to determine 
what lay at the base of their delinquent behavior, and to provide social services 
to address those underlying problems.18 The juvenile adjudication process was 
deliberately kept informal, vesting judges with enormous discretion to encourage 
individualized responses to each juvenile's unique issues.19 
In keeping with this rehabilitative goal, initially juveniles were not accorded 
due process rights because the juvenile proceeding was characterized as purely 
beneficial for the child.20 Children were entitled "not to liberty, but to custody."21 
The state's intervention, even compulsory placement in a state juvenile 
institution, was therefore not viewed as a deprivation of the child's rights, but a 
fulfillment of that "right to custody."22 
However, when the Supreme Court took a critical look at the juvenile 
system in 1967, in In re Gault, it concluded that "failure to observe the 
fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances, which might 
have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate 
findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy."23 In Gerald Gault's 
case, the Court noted that the consequences of the boy's crime, making a lewd 
prank call to a neighbor, would have been much less severe if he had been an 
adult. 24 If Gerald had been eighteen instead of fifteen, the maximum punishment 
he could have received would have been either a fine of five to fifty dollars or 
imprisonment for at most two months.25 Instead, he was involuntarily committed 
to a state institution for a period of years, without any of the procedural 
protections which would have been present in an adult criminal trial.26 
In order to remedy the risk of arbitrary and unfair results such as Gault's, 
the Court held that a juvenile has the right to notice of the charges against him,27 
to the assistance of counsel,28 to confront and cross-examine witnesses,29 and to 
the privilege against self-incrimination.30 Later cases expanded the application of 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing the evolution of the juvenile justice system 
and the rationale behind early denial of due process to juvenile adjudicants). 
 21. Id. at 17. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 19–20. 
 24. Id. at 29. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 33–34. 
 28. Id. at 41. 
 29. Id. at 57. 
 30. Id. at 55. 
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adult criminal rights to juvenile adjudications in what appeared to be an 
unceasing march toward parity.31 
However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, that march ended when the Supreme 
Court held that trial by jury was not constitutionally required in juvenile 
adjudications.32 In a plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun explained that past 
Supreme Court decisions had explicitly declined to decide whether juvenile 
adjudications were purely criminal or civil.33 Instead, the Court traditionally 
evaluated whether a given right was essential to ensure a fundamentally fair 
proceeding.34 To that end, the Court had placed an emphasis on those procedural 
rights which enhanced "fact-finding procedures"35 so that the child would not 
"receive the worst of both worlds."36 The plurality stated that a jury would "not 
strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding function."37 Instead, a jury trial would 
actually have a negative effect since it would "remake the juvenile proceeding 
into a fully adversary process and [would] put an effective end to what has been 
the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding."38 The 
Court feared that the use of juries would bring "the traditional delay, the 
formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial," 
ending a flawed but still valuable system. 39 Although it encouraged states to 
experiment with the use of jury trials in juvenile court, the Court refused to find 
that a jury trial was a constitutional right in juvenile cases.40 
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in McKeiver, joined by Justices 
Black and Marshall.41 Douglas argued that since juveniles are already treated as 
criminals subject to punishments tantamount to incarceration, they should 
receive all the protections the Bill of Rights affords adults.42 He contended that 
the addition of the juvenile trial right would not fundamentally change the 
nature of the juvenile system,43 would mitigate the risk of judicial prejudice, and 
 
 31. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt as 
standard in juvenile adjudications); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy attaches to 
juvenile adjudications). 
 32. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 33. Id. at 541. 
 34. Id. at 543. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (“There is evidence, in fact, that there may be 
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the 
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for 
children.”). 
 37. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547. 
 38. Id. at 545. 
 39. Id. at 550. 
 40. Id. Not many states have undertaken such a policy, however. As of 2008, ten states provided 
a juvenile jury right in all circumstances, ten in some circumstances, and thirty under no 
circumstances. See Linda A. Szymanski, Juvenile Delinquents’ Right to a Jury Trial (2007 Update), 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1 (Feb. 2008), http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
2008_right_to_jury_snapshot.pdf (in 2007, only nine states provided a juvenile jury trial as of right); 
In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008) (holding that juveniles had a right to a jury trial in all 
circumstances, changing Szymanski’s tally to that listed above). 
 41. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 561. 
 43. Id. at 561–63. 
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would aid in the juvenile's rehabilitation by adding a greater appearance of 
legitimacy to the process.44 
B.   The Armed Career Criminal Act 
In 1981, Senator Arlen Specter, a former District Attorney, introduced 
legislation which would later become the ACCA.45 Given recent evidence which 
suggested that a few habitual offenders were responsible for a significant portion 
of crime, Specter was concerned that habitual offenders were being inadequately 
deterred and incapacitated.46 The original bill made robbery or burglary a federal 
crime after two prior convictions for robbery or burglary and imposed a 
mandatory fifteen-year sentence for the third such offense.47 Although it passed 
the House and Senate in 1983, President Reagan pocket vetoed the legislation.48 
He may have done so out of federalism concerns triggered by the bill's transfer of 
robbery and burglary prosecutions, traditional state-law crimes, to federal 
jurisdiction.49  
Those federalism concerns were addressed in the amended version of the 
bill, which implemented a mandatory minimum of fifteen years for an offender 
who "receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce any 
firearm" (a purely federal crime) who has three or more prior convictions for 
robbery or burglary.50 This version of the Armed Career Criminal Act was 
enacted in 1984.51 It made no mention of juvenile adjudications, however, since it 
defined robbery and burglary purely as felony convictions.52 In 1986, the statute 
was amended to broaden the list of predicate offenses from felony robbery or 
burglary convictions to violent felonies or serious drug offenses.53 Today the 
statute explicitly includes juvenile adjudications for equivalent crimes.54 It now 
states that the sentence for a violation of federal firearms laws55 shall be 
increased beyond the statutory maximum to fifteen years if the offender has 
committed three or more "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses."56 
C.   Sentencing 
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States,57 the Court examined a law which 
increased the maximum penalty for reentry to the United States following 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See James Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: 
Moving Towards Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545 (2009). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 546. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 98–473, ch. XVIII, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Levine, supra note 45, at 547. 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C) (2006). 
 55. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
 57. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
Swearingen_paginated (Do Not Delete) 10/14/2011  2:27:21 PM 
210 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 3:205 2011 
deportation from two to twenty years if the deportation was triggered by a 
conviction for an aggravated felony.58 The issue raised was whether the penalty-
increase subsection constituted a new crime or merely enhanced the sentence for 
the crime of illegal reentry.59 If the prior aggravated felony was an element of a 
different crime, then it had to be included in the indictment; if, on the other hand, 
the prior conviction was merely a sentencing factor, it did not need to be 
included in the indictment or proven at trial.60 Sentencing factors, unlike 
elements of a crime, are facts that only enter into the court's calculation of 
sentence length and may be unrelated to the jury's determination of guilt or 
innocence. 
The Court determined that the prior conviction represented a sentence 
enhancement, so its omission from the indictment was constitutional.61 It began 
by noting that recidivism is "as typical a sentencing factor as one might 
imagine."62 The Court had traditionally considered recidivism as related only to 
punishment, not to the offense itself, so recidivism should be characterized as a 
sentencing factor.63 This characterization was also supported by congressional 
intent.64 Finally, the Court remarked upon the unfairness to defendants because 
mandatory inclusion of the aggravated felony in the indictment would inevitably 
prejudice the jury against them.65 
In Jones v. United States,66 the Court was confronted with provisions in a 
federal carjacking statute which increased the maximum sentence from fifteen to 
twenty-five years if serious bodily injury resulted, or to life in prison if death 
resulted.67 As in Almendarez-Torres, the issue before the Court was whether the 
sentence enhancement provisions should be characterized as creating new crimes 
or as sentencing factors for one crime.68 The Supreme Court held that the 
subsections which connected sentence length to the severity of a victim's injuries 
constituted separate crimes requiring description in the indictment and proof to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.69 Part of this holding stemmed from the 
doctrine of constitutional doubt; the language of the statute was less clear-cut 
than that of the law at issue in Almendarez-Torres and susceptible of two possible 
constructions, one of which raised serious constitutional questions and so was to 
be avoided.70 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact, other than the fact of a 
prior conviction, which increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum 
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof to a judge during 
 
 58. Id. at 226. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 228. 
 61. Id. at 226–27. 
 62. Id. at 230. 
 63. Id. at 243–44. 
 64. Id. at 235. 
 65. Id. 
 66. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 67. Id. at 229. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 229. 
 70. Id. at 240. 
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the sentencing phase of a trial by a preponderance of the evidence was 
constitutionally insufficient.71 At issue was a New Jersey statute which enhanced 
the maximum sentence for possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose from 
ten to twenty years if a judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendant was motivated by racial bias.72 Apprendi contended that his due 
process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated, and 
the Court agreed.73 
Because sentencing factors, if proven, increased the "loss of liberty and the 
stigma attaching to the offense," just as the proof of the elements of a crime did, 
the same procedural concerns arose during the sentencing phase as during the 
guilt phase of a trial.74 The heightened stakes associated with the additional fact 
meant the defendant should still enjoy all the procedural protections which 
attached during trial for the underlying offense since that same risk to the 
defendant's liberty was what motivated the development of procedural 
protections during trial.75 The Court also articulated a longstanding concern that 
without the ruling attaching procedural protections to this additional sentence-
enhancing fact, states would manipulate criminal statutes to make prosecution 
easier.76 States might characterize a fact necessary to prove one offense as merely 
a sentencing factor attached to another offense, thus procuring a conviction 
without proving all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.77 
II.     THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A.   United States v. Tighe: The Minority View 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate court confronted 
with the issue of whether juvenile adjudications qualified as predicate felonies 
for the purposes of sentence enhancement under the ACCA. In United States v. 
Tighe,78 the Ninth Circuit determined that the use of Tighe's 1988 juvenile 
adjudication as one of his three predicate felonies for imposing the ACCA 
sentence enhancement violated Apprendi.79 The court quoted the Supreme Court's 
language in Jones: "One basis for that constitutional distinctiveness [of prior 
convictions] is not hard to see . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established 
through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt and jury trial 
guarantees."80 The Ninth Circuit determined that fair notice, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the right to a jury trial constituted a "fundamental 
 
 71. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000). 
 72. Id. at 469. 
 73. Id. at 474. 
 74. Id. at 484. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 485 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697–98 (1975) (state could not shift 
burden of proof of intent to defendant by characterizing intent as relevant only to punishment since 
intent was an element of the offense of murder)). 
 77. See id. 
 78. 266 F.3d 1187 (2001). 
 79. Id. at 1194. 
 80. Id. at 1193 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (original emphasis in 
Tighe)). 
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triumvirate" of procedural safeguards which must all attach for a proceeding to 
qualify as a prior conviction.81 
The court also relied on language from Apprendi which reiterated the 
importance of procedural protections to the prior convictions exception.82 The 
Ninth Circuit interpreted the Court's reluctance to expand upon the rationale of 
Almendarez-Torres in Apprendi as a directive to narrowly interpret the prior 
convictions exception.83 Since juvenile adjudications lack all elements of the 
"fundamental triumvirate," the majority reasoned, they fall outside the prior 
convictions exception.84 
Judge Brunetti dissented.85 He characterized the majority's inference from 
the Supreme Court's language in Jones to the existence of a "fundamental 
triumvirate of rights" without which a juvenile adjudication could not qualify as 
a prior conviction as a "quantum leap."86 Judge Brunetti reasoned that as long as 
the defendant "received all the process that was due when he was convicted of 
the predicate crime," the predicate crime was a prior conviction.87 "For adults, 
this would indeed include the right to a jury trial. For juveniles, it does not."88 
Finally, he predicted that the majority's decision would in fact negatively impact 
defendants, since prosecutors would simply prove the fact of the juvenile 
adjudication to the jury, resulting in prejudice to the defendant.89 
B.  United States v. Smalley: The Majority View 
A year later, in United States v. Smalley,90 the Eight Circuit considered the 
same issue and arrived at the opposite result.91 The Eighth Circuit framed the 
issue differently, refusing to make the same "quantum leap"92 from the Supreme 
Court's statement in Jones to a mandatory requirement of fair notice, a jury trial, 
and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for qualification as a prior 
conviction.93 Instead, the Eighth Circuit characterized the Court's language in 
Jones as indicating that those three safeguards were sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of Apprendi, but were not necessary to do so.94 They conceived the 
set of procedural safeguards as lying on a continuum between "two poles": at one 
pole was what the Court had established in Jones and Apprendi to be clearly 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1194 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 (“there is a vast difference between accepting 
the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the 
right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.”)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1198 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 1200. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1200–01. 
 90. 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 91. Id. at 1031. 
 92. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1200. 
 93. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032. 
 94. Id. 
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constitutionally adequate (a jury trial, the reasonable doubt standard of proof, 
and fair notice), and at the other, what was constitutionally inadequate (a lower 
standard of proof, no jury trial).95 The situation presented by juvenile 
adjudications lay in the gray area between those two poles, so Supreme Court 
precedent was not directly on point.96 
The Smalley court determined that the due process rights which attached to 
juvenile adjudications placed the juvenile adjudication closer to the clearly 
constitutional pole.97 The court noted that "juvenile defendants have the right to 
notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 
and the privilege against self-incrimination."98 Instead of looking for the presence 
of a particular bundle of rights, as the Ninth Circuit had, the Eighth Circuit asked 
whether the rights which did attach to juvenile adjudications were "sufficient to 
ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires."99 In finding juvenile adjudications 
were sufficiently reliable, the Smalley court noted that one of the reasons the 
Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial did not attach in juvenile 
adjudications was that it would "not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding 
function."100 
C.   Other Courts: Consensus Emerges 
The rest of the circuit courts to consider this issue have followed the Eight 
Circuit's rationale and held that juvenile adjudications were prior convictions 
under Apprendi.101 Recently, in Welch v. United States, the Seventh Circuit took the 
majority position.102 The Welch majority held that "the protections juvenile 
defendants receive—notice, counsel, confrontation and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt—ensure that the proceedings are reliable," and since they are 
reliable, they satisfy Apprendi.103 
Judge Posner dissented.104 He first noted that juvenile adjudications are not 
technically "convictions" and are best described as "quasi-criminal."105 Because 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1033. 
 98. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
 99. Id. at 1033. 
 100. Id. (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971)). 
 101. See United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2010) (McKeiver “squarely foreclosed” 
Wright’s claim that nonjury juvenile adjudications could not be used as prior convictions since if 
those adjudications were sufficiently reliable to deprive a juvenile of his liberty, they were reliable 
enough for the ACCA); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the Ninth 
Circuit’s view as a “narrow parsing of words,” following the Eight and Third Circuits in holding that 
juvenile adjudications were prior convictions); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 
2005) (procedural safeguards in a juvenile adjudication met the “minimum” requirement for due 
process); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003) (following the Eighth Circuit in holding 
that as long as the juvenile had received all the process to which he was due, his prior adjudications 
qualified as prior convictions); see also United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (although 
Massachusetts grants a juvenile jury trial right, the First Circuit indicated its support for the Eight 
Circuit’s interpretation). 
 102. 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 103. Id. at 429. 
 104. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). 
Swearingen_paginated (Do Not Delete) 10/14/2011  2:27:21 PM 
214 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 3:205 2011 
juvenile adjudications have a different purpose and arise in a different context 
than adult criminal convictions, 
whether a juvenile can be imprisoned on the basis of findings made by a 
juvenile-court judge rather than by a jury is different from whether a "conviction" 
so procured (if it should even be called a "conviction") is the kind of "prior 
conviction" to which the Court referred in Apprendi, namely a conviction that can 
be used to jack up a person's sentence beyond what would otherwise be the 
statutory maximum.106 
Posner also stated that the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi indicated 
the inherent importance of the jury trial right beyond its role as a safeguard of 
reliability.107 Finally, Judge Posner argued that in fact juvenile adjudications may 
not be as factually reliable as adult criminal proceedings, citing studies which 
imply a greater likelihood of wrongful conviction in juvenile court than in the 
adult criminal system.108 
State courts, albeit in slightly different procedural contexts, have been more 
equally divided. Kansas, Indiana, and California indicated their support for the 
majority view.109 Oregon and Louisiana, however, held that nonjury juvenile 
adjudications could not be used for sentence enhancement without violating 
Apprendi.110 
III.     ANALYSIS 
The contention that juryless juvenile adjudications can be used to enhance a 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum has received widespread support in 
federal and state courts alike. Its reception among academics and law student 
commentators, however, has been far colder.111 Some dissent stems from the 
belief that McKeiver should be overturned, either (1) because it was wrongly 
decided in 1971 or (2) because the juvenile system has since strayed even further 
 
 105. Id. at 430. 
 106. Id. at 430–31. 
 107. See id. at 431 (“Otherwise why does the Supreme Court require that any fact, as distinct from 
a conviction, used to enhance a sentence be a fact found by a jury (unless of course the defendant 
waived a jury)? Why didn't the Court just say that the fact must be found by a reliable means?”). 
 108. Id. at 432 (citing Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for 
Wrongful Convictions? 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (2007)); Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between 
Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of 
Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1161–77 (2003); Martin Guggenheim & Randy 
Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 564–82 (1998); Bluhm Legal Clinic, Why Youth Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions, http://cwcy.org/WhyYouthContributes.aspx (visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 109. See People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. 4th 1007 (Cal. 2009) (juvenile adjudications may be used as 
“strikes” for the Three Strikes law); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2005) (juvenile 
adjudications qualify for habitual offender sentence enhancement); State v. Hitt, 273 Kan. 224 (Kan. 
2002) (upholding the use of juvenile adjudications for adult sentence enhancements). 
 110. See State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 (Or. 2005) (juryless juvenile adjudications could not be used 
for sentencing because the jury served as a bulwark between people and government which had no 
substitute in juvenile adjudications); State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1288 (La. 2004) (juvenile 
adjudications are not reliable enough for use in sentence enhancement during adult criminal 
proceedings). 
 111. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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from its initial focus on rehabilitation so that it is now comparable to the adult 
criminal system in its punitive purpose, requiring comparable procedural 
rights.112 Other disagreement rests with the application of the framework 
provided by the Eighth Circuit in Smalley.113 Some commentators argue that the 
relevant inquiry should instead be whether the prior adjudication was a result of 
a jury trial and that a focus only on reliability is too broad.114 
This paper contends, like the majority of courts, that the use of juvenile 
adjudications to trigger the ACCA sentence enhancement does not violate due 
process. First, Apprendi holds that any fact, other than a prior conviction, which 
increases a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Nowhere does the Court state that a prior conviction 
must itself have been proven to a jury. The inquiry adopted by the Ninth Circuit 
and others is thus a misinterpretation of constitutional law. Therefore, the 
framework presented by the Eighth Circuit—whether the prior proceeding 
carries sufficient procedural guarantees of reliability115—is most in line with the 
Supreme Court precedent. Second, juryless juvenile adjudications are sufficiently 
reliable to qualify as prior convictions. They carry a multiplicity of procedural 
safeguards intended to produce a fair, factually accurate result.116 Third, 
categorizing juryless juvenile adjudications as prior convictions under Apprendi 
serves both the interests of the state and the defendant. Defendants would be 
disadvantaged if the contrary position, juvenile adjudications are sufficiently 
reliable for disposition of a juvenile case but not for adult sentence enhancement, 
were to be implemented.117 
It is a misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent to construe the prior 
convictions exception as requiring a jury trial for a prior proceeding to qualify. 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis rests almost entirely on one sentence in Jones v. 
United States, in which the Supreme Court explained that "one basis" for treating 
sentence enhancements based on recidivism differently was that procedural 
rights, including a jury trial, had attached in the prior proceeding.118 The Ninth 
 
 112. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 268 (“The McKeiver Court did not adequately consider the role of 
a jury, nor did the Court adequately account for a juvenile adjudication's criminal nature when it 
decided that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial”); Kropf, supra note 10, at 2150 (reasoning that 
because the juvenile court system has become more punitive in nature since McKeiver was decided in 
1971, and because nonjury juvenile adjudications are used for federal sentencing purposes, McKeiver 
should be overruled). 
 113. United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (“We conclude that the question of whether 
juvenile adjudications should be exempt from Apprendi’s general rule should not turn on the narrow 
parsing of words, but on an examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are 
so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Thill, supra note 9, at 593 (using reliability as the benchmark introduces a slippery 
slope problem). 
 115. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032–33. 
 116. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof in juvenile proceedings is beyond a 
reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (establishing juvenile right to notice, counsel, 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and privilege against self-incrimination). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200–01 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (expressing 
concern that a defendant will face the “Hobson’s choice” of either stipulating to facts which will 
prejudice a jury against him or allowing the prosecution to prove those facts to the jury). 
 118. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion). 
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Circuit's reliance on this sentence is a logical stretch because it jumps from "one 
basis" to the existence of a "fundamental triumvirate of procedural 
protections."119 It also omits the other possible reasons recidivism is treated 
differently in Supreme Court jurisprudence: the traditional use of recidivism as a 
sentencing factor,120 and the fact that recidivism does not relate to the offense, 
but only to punishment, "so may be subsequently decided."121 Even though, as 
several courts have pointed out, Almendarez-Torres is perhaps on shaky 
ground,122 it still remains good law, and the uniqueness of recidivism as 
articulated in Almendarez-Torres has been affirmed in later cases. In Jones v. United 
States,123 the Supreme Court explained that recidivism's traditional use as a 
sentencing factor was one explanation for its constitutional distinctiveness. In 
Apprendi, the Court distinguished the recidivism enhancement provision at issue 
in Almendarez-Torres from New Jersey's hate crime statute by noting again that 
recidivism is unrelated to the offense while a consideration into the defendant's 
motive during the offense, such as racial bias, is closely related.124 
Supreme Court precedent on an analogous issue supports the majority view 
as the California Supreme Court stated in Nguyen.125 In Nichols v. United States, 
the Court held that "a prior constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction could be employed in a subsequent federal felony proceeding to 
increase the defendant's criminal history score, and thus his maximum 
punishment, for the felony offense."126 Under Scott v. Illinois, a defendant charged 
with a misdemeanor only has the right to counsel if his conviction results in 
imprisonment.127 Since Nichols's misdemeanor conviction did not result in 
imprisonment, all of his due process rights had been satisfied, even though he 
never waived his right to counsel.128 
 
 119. See id. at 1200 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). 
 120. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (“the holding last Term rested in 
substantial part on the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor”); Almendarez-Torres 
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998) (recidivism is “a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis 
for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence”). 
 121. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244 (also stating that “The Court has not deviated from this 
view.”). 
 122. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489 (2000) (“Even though it is arguable that 
Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided”); State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157, 170 (2005) (noting that prior 
convictions remain exceptions “for now”) (citing Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1264 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1264 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Almendarez-Torres. . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly 
decided. The parties do not request it here, but in an appropriate case, this Court should reconsider 
Almendarez-Torres’ continuing viability.”). 
 123. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 248 (explaining that Almendarez-Torres did not control the issue in Jones 
“not merely because we are concerned with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and not alone the 
rights to indictment and notice as claimed by Almendarez-Torres, but because the holding last Term 
rested in substantial part on the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor.”). 
 124. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496. 
 125. People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal.4th 1007, 1026 (Cal. 2009). 
 126. Id. at 1026 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)). 
 127. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 128. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 741 (1994). 
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This lack of a procedural safeguard, the right to counsel, did not preclude 
the use of the misdemeanor conviction to increase a later sentence because 
another safeguard did apply; the misdemeanor was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.129 In addition, the court recognized that recidivism is different. 
Recidivism only involves demonstrating characteristics of the offender, not the 
offense, and it has traditionally played an important role in sentencing.130 As the 
California Supreme Court saw, there is a clear parallel between the uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction in Nichols and the juryless juvenile adjudications at 
issue here.131  
Since the Ninth Circuit's construction of the question is inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent on the uniqueness of recidivism as a sentencing 
factor,132 the Eighth Circuit's framework more accurately reflects the state of 
sentencing law. Because Apprendi requires that prior convictions be imbued with 
enough procedural rights to secure their reliability, the appropriate question is 
whether the lack of a jury trial renders juvenile convictions unreliable. Here, 
Supreme Court precedent supplies a clear answer. The Court repeatedly 
affirmed the factual accuracy of juryless juvenile adjudications in McKeiver.133 
This assertion makes sense given the number of other procedural safeguards 
granted to juveniles: the right to notice, the right to counsel, the highest standard 
of proof, the protection from double jeopardy, the right against self-
incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.134 
 In addition, a contrary holding, that juvenile adjudications are sufficiently 
reliable for their own purposes but not for sentence enhancements for adult 
criminal convictions, has several problems. Not only does it directly contradict 
the Supreme Court's assertion that nonjury juvenile proceedings are factually 
accurate,135 it conflicts with the Court's conception of the seriousness of an 
adjudication of delinquency since it may well result in a deprivation of the 
juvenile's liberty.136 The Supreme Court granted procedural guarantees to 
juveniles because the seriousness of the consequences of a juvenile adjudication 
was in some ways comparable to imprisonment.137 Holding that a lower level of 
factual accuracy is acceptable in juvenile adjudications despite their serious 
consequences flies in the face of the Supreme Court's rationale.138 
 
 129. Nguyen, 46 Cal. 4th at 1026 (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 744–48). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1998) (establishing Court’s 
continued commitment to recidivism as a sentencing factor because of its traditional use and because 
it relates to the punishment, not the offense); Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747 (noting the traditional 
importance of recidivism at sentencing); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 503 (1962) (defendant does not 
have the right to advance notice of recidivist enhancement). 
 133. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (jury is not necessary for “accurate 
factfinding”). 
 134. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 135. McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528. 
 136. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (describing similarities between placement in a juvenile 
facility and imprisonment). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365–66 (1970) (juvenile adjudications, which also result in loss 
of liberty, are comparable in seriousness to criminal prosecutions). 
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In addition, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tighe may in fact run 
counter to the interests of adult criminal defendants. As the dissent in Tighe 
noted,139 holding that juvenile adjudications fall outside the prior convictions 
exception of Apprendi does not mean that juvenile adjudications will have no 
impact on an adult defendant's sentencing under the ACCA. The defendant 
would have to choose between stipulating to the prior convictions or allowing 
the prosecutor to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt in front of the jury.140 If 
this proof requires more than documentary evidence of the fact that the juvenile 
adjudication occurred, then the defendant is still prejudiced, perhaps to an even 
greater degree, because due process might only be satisfied by having the truth 
of the juvenile adjudication re-litigated before the jury empanelled for the adult 
offense.141 
Litigating an old crime involves logistical difficulties, such as the 
unavailability of witnesses or the loss of evidence, which may burden defendants 
more than it would the government.142 The prosecution will be able to use 
juvenile court documents to support its case and may more easily be able to track 
down witnesses for the state. These witnesses may be able to testify about an old 
case in greater detail than lay witnesses. The defendant, however, may have 
difficulty tracking down lay witnesses, who might, even if found, have more 
difficulty recalling the events in question. 
The difficulty of finding witnesses to testify on his behalf may lead to 
greater pressure on the defendant himself to testify simply out of necessity, a 
litigation strategy many defendants prefer to forego. Stipulation to the truth of 
the juvenile adjudication avoids the difficulty of litigating an old case but not the 
prejudice to the jury. Whether the defendant chooses to stipulate or re-litigate the 
juvenile adjudication, the jury will already have heard evidence concerning the 
adult firearms offense to which the ACCA enhancement will be applied. They 
may thus be predisposed to see the defendant as a criminal and find it easier to 
believe he began his criminal career early in life. Although this serious risk of 
prejudice to the defendant could be mitigated by the use of sentencing juries, as 
the Tighe majority noted,143 the use of sentencing juries in noncapital criminal 
 
 139. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200–01 (2001) (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (“Thus, a 
defendant with a prior juvenile adjudication will be put to the Hobson's choice of stipulating to the 
priors or parading them before a jury.”). 
 140. The Indiana and Kansas Supreme Courts both expressed concern over the practical effects on 
the judicial system of a rule requiring proof of the existence of a juvenile adjudication to a jury. See 
Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 1970) (describing the court’s fear that an “untold number” of 
defendants would “clog” the courts on remand); State v. Hitt, 273 Kan. 224, 235 (2002) (explaining 
that holding that juvenile adjudications were not “prior convictions” would require “the resentencing 
of many”). 
 141. See People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 961 (Cal. 2009) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (construes 
Apprendi as requiring “a jury trial not only on the ‘fact’ of the existence of a prior adjudication, as the 
majority does, but also, unlike the majority, as requiring a jury trial on the conduct that led to that 
adjudication.”). 
 142. See Ryle, 824 N.E.2d at 323 (“requiring a jury to decide whether a defendant was a juvenile 
delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt by hearing stale evidence no more ensures reliability than 
allowing the trial judge to make a decision based upon a properly admitted record of conviction.”). 
 143. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1195 n.5. 
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cases is almost unheard of and would require sweeping reform of questionable 
political and administrative feasibility.144 
Likewise, juvenile adjudicants could also be disadvantaged if juvenile 
adjudications were held to fall outside the bounds of the prior conviction 
exception. If the underlying rationale for their exclusion from the exception is 
that nonjury juvenile adjudications are insufficiently reliable, as the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held in State v. Brown,145 the message sent to juveniles about the 
legitimacy of the juvenile court system is a bleak one. The perception that 
imprisonment-like institutionalization is the result of a process that is 
constitutionally permitted to be less reliable than an adult criminal conviction 
would surely not aid rehabilitation.146 
If nonjury juvenile adjudications are in fact less reliable than adult criminal 
trials, as some commentators and dissenting judges have implied,147 the problem 
is much larger than simply whether juvenile adjudications should continue to be 
used under the ACCA. Wholesale reform of the juvenile justice system would 
appear to be the only fair response, given the serious consequences of juvenile 
adjudication.148 It is not clear, though, that the lack of a jury is what causes this 
ostensible unreliability and that the introduction of a jury would cure it. Judge 
Posner contends in his dissent in Welch that 
the literature finds that judges are more likely to convict in juvenile cases than 
juries are in criminal cases. Juvenile-court judges are exposed to inadmissible 
evidence; they hear the same stories from defendants over and over again, 
leading them to treat defendants' testimony with skepticism; they become 
chummy with the police and apply a lower standard of scrutiny to the testimony 
of officers whom they have come to trust; and they make their decisions alone 
rather than as a group and so their decisions lack the benefits of group 
deliberation.149 
But these contentions are all debatable. For instance, judges may be more 
prone to convict in juvenile court than juries in criminal court, but the issue here 
is whether judges are more prone to convict in juvenile court than juries in 
juvenile court, so Posner's evidence is not on point. In addition, the fact that 
criminal court juries are more lenient than juvenile court judges might be a 
reflection of other features of the juvenile system than this supposed judicial bias. 
Perhaps juvenile court judges are harsher because juvenile court defense 
attorneys are less zealous in their advocacy, a trend Posner also bemoans.150 They 
 
 144. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 953 (2003) (noting 
that forty-five states and the federal government do not permit juries to make sentencing decisions in 
noncapital felony cases). 
 145. 879 So. 2d 1276, 1288 (La. 2004). 
 146. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967) (proceedings which both are and appear fair will be more 
therapeutic for the child); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 562 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(the appearance of due process and fairness will help juveniles perceive their incarceration to be 
legitimate). 
 147. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting); 
Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289; Thill, supra note 9. 
 148. See supra notes 136, 138. 
 149. Welch, 604 F.3d at 432 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. 
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file fewer pretrial motions and "appear reluctant to file appeals."151 It is unclear 
that the presence of a jury alone would encourage more zealous advocacy unless 
the jury was tasked with punishment, not, as the juvenile court judge is, with 
providing a solution which encourages rehabilitation. What may encourage more 
aggressive advocacy, however, is the potential for future use of a juvenile 
adjudication in a criminal proceeding.152 
Indeed, juvenile court juries might conceivably be less fair than juvenile 
court judges, particularly when confronted with a juvenile accused of a serious 
violent felony or drug trafficking offense. Juries may be more susceptible than 
judges to negative media coverage of juvenile delinquents, and media coverage 
of juvenile delinquents leads viewers to drastically overestimate the likelihood 
that juveniles commit serious crimes.153 Jurors may thus find it harder than a 
juvenile court judge, one who is familiar with and committed to the rehabilitative 
focus of juvenile court, to approach juveniles without bias. Juvenile court jurors 
might also have difficulty sympathizing with a juvenile delinquent because 
minors do not serve on juries. In a real sense, juveniles cannot access a jury of 
their peers. Perhaps it is for that reason that juveniles have generally declined to 
take advantage of their right to a jury trial in those states in which it exists.154 
It is also possible, though, that the infrequent use of juvenile court juries in 
states which provide them is more an indicator of the poor quality of 
representation which juveniles are alleged to receive.155 Juvenile court attorneys, 
overwhelmed by high caseloads, are inattentive to the basics of trial practice, 
often relying on juveniles or their families to contact witnesses for the juvenile, 
and "rarely" filing pretrial motions or appeals.156 These overloaded attorneys 
may also be reluctant to take on the added time and effort required for a jury 
trial. If their reluctance is at the root of the low rate of juvenile jury trials in 
jurisdictions which grant them, then those numbers may not reflect juveniles' 
considerations of whether a jury trial is in their best interest. 
However, while this article contends, like most courts, that a juryless 
juvenile adjudication is sufficiently reliable to be used for the ACCA, a jury trial 
may have other benefits beyond its role as a procedural safeguard. There may be 
other arguments for incorporating a jury trial into the juvenile justice system 
beyond the risk that a juvenile adjudication will later serve as the basis for an 
adult sentence enhancement. In his dissent, Judge Posner construed Supreme 
Court precedent as reflecting the unique importance of the jury trial as more than 
just "a reliable means."157 Indeed, since juveniles themselves may already view 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Edwards, supra note 9, at 1354–55 (describing how the use of juvenile adjudications as 
sentence enhancements will encourage more zealous juvenile court advocacy). 
 153. See Vincent Schiraldi, Juvenile Crime is Decreasing—It’s Media Coverage That’s Soaring, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/nov/22/local/me-36357. 
 154. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 290 n. 207 (citing surveys which show that only between one and 
three percent of juvenile cases are decided by juries in those states which make them available). 
 155. See, e.g., Welch, 604 F.3d at 432 (Posner, J., dissenting) (describing factors which render 
juvenile court attorneys unlikely to be able to represent their clients’ interests adequately). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 431 (“Otherwise why does the Supreme Court require that any fact, as distinct from 
a conviction, used to enhance a sentence be a fact found by a jury . . . ?”). 
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the juvenile court system as "formal and adversarial,"158 they may expect to see a 
jury and doubt the legitimacy of the proceedings when one is not present.159 
Since proceedings which appear fair to juveniles are more likely to encourage 
rehabilitation, the lack of a jury trial in juvenile court may in fact detract from the 
courts' rehabilitative goal.160 This perception of unfairness might also distinguish 
juvenile court adjudications from adult criminal convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal appellate courts, state supreme courts, and commentators alike have 
wrestled with this issue: do juvenile adjudications qualify as prior convictions 
even though there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court? This 
article concludes that the majority of courts are correct. In the absence of a clear 
mandate from the Supreme Court on this issue (which it has repeatedly declined 
to provide),161 the framework first provided by the Eighth Circuit in Smalley162 
should guide the analysis because it is most consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent on multiple constitutional issues. Based on the special place recidivism 
has as a sentencing factor in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the many procedural 
rights which do attach in juvenile adjudications, and the Supreme Court's 
determination in McKeiver that a jury trial would not enhance the accuracy of a 
juvenile adjudication,163 this paper reasons that juvenile adjudications are 
sufficiently reliable indicators of recidivism to be used under the ACCA. 
If they are not sufficiently reliable, as Louisiana held in State v. Brown,164 to 
be used for adult criminal sentence enhancement, then the procedures in place in 
juvenile adjudications do not adequately ensure a factually accurate result.165 The 
lack of a jury may leave the juvenile adjudication so likely to produce a wrongful 
"conviction" that it cannot be used as a reliable indicator of past criminal activity. 
If this is the case, then surely the use of juvenile adjudications for sentence 
enhancements is the least of our problems; the validity of the entire juvenile 
system is called into question. Merely prohibiting the use of juvenile 
adjudications in adult sentence enhancements would be a woefully inadequate 
remedy.  
Although the juvenile system has its flaws, it seems unlikely that the 
addition of another procedural right, the jury trial, would be a magic bullet. 
Additional training for judges or educating juvenile attorneys about the 
collateral consequences of juvenile adjudications might directly address the 
 
 158. See Marrus, supra note 9, at 2170 (“It is unlikely that the juveniles involved in the juvenile 
court system—brought before judges, held in prison cells prior to a judicial hearing, counseled by 
attorneys—view it as anything but formal and adversarial.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Smalley v. United States, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003) (cert denied); Jones v. United States, 540 
U.S. 1150 (2004) (cert denied); Burge v. United States, 546 U.S. 981 (2005) (cert denied); Crowell v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008) (cert denied); Wright v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 507 
(Nov. 1, 2010) (cert denied). 
 162. 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 163. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 164. 879 So. 2d 1276 (La. 2004). 
 165. See United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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concerns over the juvenile court's reliability. Further, it is unclear as a policy 
matter that the outcome urged by the Ninth Circuit and by many commentators 
who argue that juvenile adjudications should not be considered prior convictions 
(but should be proven to a jury) would in fact benefit either defendants facing 
ACCA sentencing or forward-looking juvenile adjudicants. And, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in McKeiver,166 the policy reasons for judge-only juvenile 
adjudications (that juryless adjudications encourage confidentiality, informality, 
and flexibility without compromising fact-finding accuracy) are laudable; they 
are closely related to the value of having a juvenile justice system at all. 
Likewise, there are strong policy reasons for using juvenile adjudications as 
a measure of recidivism under the ACCA. The purpose of the bill was to "curb 
armed career criminals," and its development was spurred by the need to target 
habitual offenders.167 Like all habitual offender statutes, the ACCA attempts to 
fight crime by increasing the level of deterrence provided by the law in order to 
target criminals who have shown themselves to be insufficiently deterred by a 
lower level of punishment. It also reduces crime by incapacitating those 
offenders who resist rehabilitation or deterrence. Finally, enhancing a sentence 
for recidivism satisfies the goal of retribution, since it is more blameworthy to 
continue committing violent felonies despite repeated warnings from society. 
The use of juvenile adjudications as ACCA predicate offenses allows judges to 
identify and incapacitate career criminals sooner, thus preventing more crimes, 
and it enables courts to accurately judge a defendant's blameworthiness. For 
reasons of policy and precedent, then, the majority of courts have it right: 
juvenile adjudications come with enough procedural safeguards to ensure their 




 166. 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971). 
 167. See Levine, supra note 46, at 546. 
